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Abstract
The asymmetric dominance effect refers to the phenomenon according to which the choice
probability of an alternative increases when an inferior alternative - the decoy - is included
into the choice set. The objective of this experimental study is twofold. First, we investigate
the asymmetric dominance effect on two-outcome lotteries with almost equal expected values.
We find that the impact of a decoy on low-variance lotteries (LVLs) is much higher than on
high-variance lotteries (HVLs). Second, we examine the asymmetric dominance effect in the
presence of two decoys. While the asymmetric dominance effect persists when the choice
set includes two decoys, the effect is not always further enhanced compared to the setting
with one decoy and again much stronger for LVLs than for HVLs. Controlling for subjects’
degrees of risk aversion, we find support for consistency between individual risk preferences
and choice behavior among the lotteries. However, we observe decoy effects of equal strength
irrespective of the subjects’ degree of risk aversion. Thus, our analysis indicates that to a
substantial extent the presence of decoys subtly makes decision-makers choose against their
risk preferences by favoring lotteries that entail risks contrary to their elicited individual
risk-taking profile.
Keywords: Asymmetric dominance effect, decoy effects, multiple decoys, risk aversion,
individual decision making, experimental economics
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1 Introduction
There is overwhelming evidence that the structure of a choice set can influence agents’ choices:
that is, choices are context-dependent. The asymmetric dominance effect, first demonstrated by
Huber et al. (1982), is among the most studied context-dependent behaviors. This effect refers
to the systematic violation of rationality induced by the introduction of an inferior alternative
to a choice set. More specifically, it can be described as the phenomenon according to which the
choice probability of an alternative might increase when an inferior alternative is included in
the choice set. Consider, for example, a binary choice set consisting of two alternatives, A and
B, that are characterized by two attributes. Suppose A is better in the first attribute and B is
better in the second. In a typical experimental study both A and B are chosen. Now consider the
introduction of a third alternative that is dominated by one of the two alternatives, say by A, as
illustrated in Figure 1. According to the rationality principle, this newly introduced alternative,
which is referred to as decoy, does not have any impact on choices. It should basically be ignored
due to being dominated by another alternative in the choice set. However, evidence shows that
there is a significant increase in the market share of the dominating alternative, hence the name
target.
atrribute 1
attribute 2
b
B
b
A
b
decoy of A
Figure 1: Choice Set with a Decoy
This systemic violation of rationality has been studied extensively in the literature on psy-
chology, marketing, consumer behavior and decision making, and replicated using many differ-
ent experimental settings. The effect has been observed when subjects are given real incentives
(Herne, 1998, 1999; Simonson and Tversky, 1992); when choice sets consist of non-market alter-
natives (Bateman et al., 2008), policy alternatives (Herne, 1997), gambles (Herne, 1999; Wedell,
1991) or investment alternatives (Schwarzkopf, 2003); when the experimental design is within-
subject (Lehmann and Pan, 1994; Simonson, 1989; Wedell and Pettibone, 1996) or between-
subject (Dhar and Glazer, 1996; Highhouse, 1996) and even when the subjects are humming-
birds (Bateson et al., 2003), gray jays (Shafir et al., 2002), tu´ngara frogs (Lea and Ryan, 2015)
or amoeboid organisms (Latty and Beekman, 2011). Furthermore, in a field experiment con-
ducted in a grocery store, Doyle et al. (1999) have shown that the asymmetric dominance effect
plays an important role in actual markets.
After its demonstration by Huber et al. (1982), several explanations for why the asymmetric
dominance effect occurs have been put forward. Among the most commonly tested explanations
is the range-frequency theory by Parducci (1974). This theory points out that the introduction
of a decoy has two impacts on the choice set: first, it extends the range of the attribute on which
the target is weakest, and second, it increases the frequency of the other attribute on which the
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target is superior. For example, thanks to the decoy, the choice set illustrated in Figure 1 has a
wider range on attribute 2 and a higher frequency on attribute 1 with respect to the choice set
without the decoy. According to the range-frequency theory, the extension in the range causes
the distance on attribute 2 between the target and its competitor to be perceived as smaller than
it would have been without the decoy. The frequency increase instead tends to spread out the
perceived distance on attribute 1 between the target and its competitor. Therefore, the intro-
duction of a decoy makes the target look better in comparison to the competitor by increasing
its perceived attractiveness and thus causes the asymmetric dominance effect. To distinguish
between the range and the frequency explanations, Huber et al. (1982) use three different types
of decoys: (i) the r-decoy which only extends the relevant range without changing frequency,
(ii) the f -decoy which only increases the relevant frequency without touching to range, (iii)
the rf -decoy which combines r- and f -decoys. Figure 2 illustrates a choice set, where A is the
target and A′r, A
′
f and A
′
rf are r-, f - and rf -decoys, respectively. Huber et al. (1982) find no
significant results for frequency increase but do for the range extension hypothesis. However,
the results seem to suggest that a simple range extension explanation alone is not sufficient.
Heath and Chatterjee (1995) report a meta-analysis that supports the range extension expla-
nation and demonstrates that larger range extensions produce larger increases in the target’s
share.
atrribute 1
attribute 2
b
B
b
A
b
A′f
b
A′r
b
A′rf
Figure 2: Choice Set with Different Types of Decoys
Wedell (1991) extends the analysis of Huber et al. (1982) to the environment where choice
alternatives are two-outcome lotteries. He shows that the asymmetric dominance effect is highly
significant and the results support both range and frequency explanations. However, there is
no significant change when different types of decoys are used. On account of this observation,
Wedell (1991) claims that the asymmetric dominance effect is best explained by agents’ use of
the dominance heuristic. According to this explanation, agents employ a decision strategy in
which they first look for a dominance relation between alternatives and choose the dominating
alternative if such a relation exists. This hypothesis is also supported by the findings of a
Magnetic Resonance Image (MRI) study that show people avoid trade-off contrast and search
for dominance (Hedgcock and Rao, 2009). Another experimental investigation of the asymmetric
dominance effect where two-outcome lotteries are used as choice alternatives is Herne (1999).
In this study, only rf -decoys are considered and subjects are given monetary incentives.1 The
1In Herne (1999), subjects were given a participation fee plus the outcome of a randomly chosen choice task.
On the other hand, the incentivization mechanism used in Wedell (1991) was to give subjects course credits for
their participation.
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results indicate that the effect persists when real incentives are used.
The economic literature proposes several choice models that accommodate the asymmetric
dominance effect. Masatlioglu et al. (2016) and Lleras et al. (2016) consider the situation, in
which agents are limited in their ability to consider all alternatives and concentrate only on
a subset of a given choice set. Agents choose the normatively best alternative in this subset.
These two models are compatible with the asymmetric dominance effect if the target, but not
the competitor, belongs to the set considered by agents. Ok et al. (2014) propose a reference-
dependent model in which given a choice set, agents choose by maximizing utility over those
alternatives that Pareto dominate a reference alternative. Lombardi (2009) axiomatizes a model
where agents select alternatives that are maximal according to a fixed but not necessarily com-
plete preference relation. If the resulting maximal set has more than one element, agents remove
those alternatives whose lower contour set is strictly contained in that of another maximal alter-
native. This model accommodates the asymmetric dominance effect only if agents are indifferent
between the target and the competitor or these two alternatives are not comparable according
to the agents’ preference relation. The reference-dependent model proposed by Barbos (2010)
concerns the situation in which choices are made across exogenously given categories. Agents
make choices as if they first evaluate each category and then choose by maximizing utility over
their favorite category. The model is compatible with the asymmetric dominance effect under
the assumption that agents perceive the target and the decoy as belonging to a category and the
competitor to another. de Clippel and Eliaz (2012) introduce a model where agents’ choices are
the cooperative solution to a bargaining problem between two selves. This model accommodates
the asymmetric dominance effect except when an f -decoy is used.
This article aims to shed light on some uninvestigated issues regarding the asymmetric
dominance effect when choice sets consist of lotteries. We first address the question of whether
the introduction of a decoy has a different impact on low-variance lotteries (LVLs) with a high
probability of low winnings than on high-variance lotteries (HVLs) with a low probability of
high winnings. Secondly, we explore the effect in the presence of two decoys. The literature on
the asymmetric dominance effect concentrates only on situations in which there exists a single
decoy, and leaves open the questions whether the effect boosts or diminishes, and whether LVLs
and HVLs are affected in the same manner in the presence of multiple decoys. Our aim is to close
this gap in the literature. Furthermore, we examine the question that is brought along by the
investigation of the asymmetric dominance effect on lotteries differing in their risk components:
How is the effect related to risk aversion?
In this article, we experimentally study and analyze individual choice behavior for two-
outcome lotteries. In addition to the control, we have four different treatments. In the first two
treatments, subjects face a choice decision from a set of three lotteries: an LVL, an HVL and a
decoy (an r-decoy or an f -decoy). The choice sets of the other two treatments include a LVL, a
HVL and two decoys (two r-decoys or two f -decoys). Finally, in our control treatment, choice
sets are decoyless: they consist of a LVL and a HVL. Each treatment ends with a questionnaire
that is served to elicit subjects’ risk preferences.
Our analysis suggests that the asymmetric dominance effect is stronger when the target is
an LVL than when it is an HVL. The effect persists also when the choice set includes two
decoys. It seems that the effect is generated by the first decoy and the second one does not
have any further impact on it. However, there is one exception: When the choice set includes
two r-decoys that target an HVL, the choice probability of the target increases significantly
compared to the case with a single r-decoy. Hence, only in this specific case does the secondary
decoy boost the asymmetric dominance effect. Interestingly, this observed increase in the choice
probability of an HVL target does not invalidate our first result in the presence of two decoys.
That is, the asymmetric dominance effect with two decoys is stronger when the target is an
LVL than when it is an HVL. Furthermore, we also control for the subjects’ risk attitudes and
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obtain strong evidence that the asymmetric dominance effect does not induce any inconsistency
in risk preferences. More specifically, the asymmetric dominance effect does not intervene the
trend that the more risk averse subjects are, the more the less risky alternative LVL is chosen.
Finally, our analysis indicates that subjects exhibit the asymmetric dominance effect irrespective
of their degree of risk aversion, and there seems to exist no correlation between the degree of
risk aversion and the strength of the effect.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the experimental design and
procedure. Section 3 explains the hypotheses. Section 4 gives the results. Finally, Section 5
concludes with a discussion.
2 Experiment
2.1 Experimental Design
In a computerized laboratory setting, we asked subjects to choose between a number of two-
outcome lotteries, each characterized by an amount to win (in our experimental currency unit,
“Taler”) and its associated probability. The second outcome was always 0 Taler. The lotteries
were displayed by means of pies including an explanatory text. An example is shown in Figure 3.
156 Taler
45%
0 Taler
55%
With this lottery you have a 45% chance
to win 156 Taler, nothing otherwise.
Figure 3: Graphical Illustration of a Lottery
The experiment involved 4 main treatments, each of which included 54 choice tasks. In
addition, one control treatment with 27 choice tasks was conducted. In the control treatment
(T0), the choice sets consisted of two lotteries with almost equal expected values. An example of
a choice set used inT0 is the following: A lottery, say A, that gives 156 Taler with a probability of
0.45 and a second lottery, say B, that gives 280 Taler with a probability of 0.25. In other words,
subjects were asked to choose between a low-variance lottery (LVL) with high probability of low
winnings (lottery A) and a high-variance lottery (HVL) with low probability of high winnings
(lottery B). These two lotteries (together with some others) are depicted in Figure 4. The
choice sets of treatments T1 and T2 consisted of three lotteries; two baseline lotteries used in
treatment T0 and a decoy. The type of decoy differed between the two treatments. We used
r-decoys in T1 and f -decoys in treatment T2. In half of the choice tasks (both in T1 and in
T2), target lotteries were LVLs and in the other half they were HVLs. Put differently, any two
baseline lotteries from treatment T0 appeared in exactly two choice sets of treatments T1 and
T2; each time the decoy was targeting a different lottery. For example, in treatment T1, the two
baseline lotteries A and B used in treatment T0 (demonstrated in Figure 4) were juxtaposed
to an r-decoy targeting lottery A (A′r in Figure 4) in one choice task. In another, they were
juxtaposed to an r-decoy targeting lottery B (B′r in Figure 4). The same procedure of choice
set construction applied also in treatment T2, but using f -decoys. That is, the two choice sets
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where lotteries A and B appeared were {A,B,A′f} and {A,B,B
′
f} (see Figure 4). In treatment
T3, we used the same set of choice tasks from T1 but added a second r-decoy to each of them.
Similarly, choice tasks of treatment T4 are constructed by adding a second f -decoy to the choice
tasks of treatment T2. Hence, subjects of the last two treatments were asked to choose between
four lotteries: two baseline and two decoy lotteries of the same type. Examples of choice sets
from T3 (T4) are {A,B,A′r, A
′′
r} and {A,B,B
′
r, B
′′
r } ({A,B,A
′
f , A
′′
f} and {A,B,B
′
f , B
′′
f}) which
are illustrated in Figure 4.
probability
amount to win
b
B
b
B′f
b
B′′f
b
B′r
b
B′′r
b
A
b
A′f
b
A′′f
b
A′r
b
A′′r
high-variance
lotteries (HVL)
low-variance
lotteries (LVL)
0.450.400.350.250.200.15
280
270
260
156
146
136
Figure 4: Illustration of Some Lotteries Used in the Experiment
Table 1 summarizes the choice set structures of the control (T0) and the 4 treatments (T1-
T4). The complete list of lotteries used in the experiment can be found in Table 8 in Appendix A.
For internal reference we numbered the tasks from 1 to 27 when decoys target an LVL and from
28 to 54 when decoys target an HVL. The order of all the 54 tasks in each treatment and the
display order of lotteries in each choice task was randomized anew for each subject. In each
treatment, after the main experiment, subjects were asked to answer a questionnaire which was
T0 T1 T2 T3 T4
number of alternatives 2 3 3 4 4
number of decoys 0 1 1 2 2
decoy type r-decoy f -decoy two r-decoys two f -decoys
choice sets
tasks 1-27
LVL, LVL, HVL LVL, HVL LVL, HVL LVL, HVL
HVL LVL′r LVL
′
f LVL
′
r, LVL
′′
r LVL
′
f , LVL
′′
f
tasks 28-54
LVL, HVL LVL, HVL LVL, HVL LVL, HVL
HVL′r HVL
′
f HVL
′
r, HVL
′′
r HVL
′
f , HVL
′′
f
Table 1: Choice Set Structures
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divided into two parts. In the first part, risk preferences were elicited by using the incentivized
lottery choice framework by Dohmen et al. (2010), followed by an unpaid second part with
questions on the socio-economic background of the participants: e.g., age, gender, field of study,
etc.
2.2 Experimental Procedure
The experiment was programmed in C++ using a z-tree interface (Fischbacher, 2007) and con-
ducted at the Business and Economic Research Laboratory (BaER-Lab) at Paderborn Univer-
sity, Germany. Subjects were recruited by the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2015)
from a pool of approximately 2,800 voluntary students of Paderborn University from different
fields of study, who are enrolled as prospective participants in economic experiments. Upon en-
tering the laboratory, subjects were randomly assigned to visually isolated computer terminals.
The instructions were distributed and subjects were asked to read them on their own. In order
to avoid misunderstandings, they were allowed to ask questions individually to an experimenter.
We ran one session for each treatment with 28 subjects. Overall, we collected 6,804 obser-
vations from 140 subjects across 5 sessions. On average, each session lasted about 75 minutes,
including the time used for reading the instructions and paying the subjects.
At the end of each treatment, a choice task was randomly chosen and subjects played the
lottery that they had chosen in that task. Note that the task was identical for all subjects in
a session. However, due to the order randomization, different subjects faced the chosen task at
different positions in the course of the experiment. Subjects played the lottery that they had
chosen by drawing a ball from an urn that corresponded to their lottery choice in the task. The
experimental currency unit, Taler, was converted into Euros at the rate of 0.05 and subjects were
paid according to the outcome of their chosen lottery. On top of that, in order to incentivize
choice decisions of the questionnaire, which we used to elicit risk preferences, two subjects were
randomly chosen and paid for one random decision row of their choice table. Average earnings
per subject were 8.54 Euro (inclusive of a 4 Euro participation fee).
3 Research Hypotheses
Our aim in this article is to explore some issues that have not been investigated in the asymmetric
dominance effect literature so far. We start with addressing the question whether the asymmetric
dominance effect differs depending on the riskiness of a target lottery. More precisely, given two
lotteries of the same expected value, we examine whether the effect is strongest when the target is
the lottery with lower variance (LVL) or the other one with higher variance (HVL). There is clear
evidence that people, in general, are risk averse and therefore choose the former over the latter
in absence of a decoy. For example, in the first stage of preference reversal experiments, where
subjects are asked to make a choice, a substantial fraction of them is shown to prefer LVLs over
HVLs (see, for example, Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Slovic and Lichtenstein, 1983). Given
this general tendency, we expect the asymmetric dominance effect to be stronger when the
target is an LVL than when it is an HVL.
Hypothesis 1. The asymmetric dominance effect is stronger when the target is a low-variance
lottery than when it is a high-variance lottery (T0 versus T1, T0 versus T2).
In our next hypothesis, we turn our attention to the impact of a secondary decoy on the
asymmetric dominance effect. There are two prominent explanations for why we observe this
effect in the presence of a single decoy: the range-frequency theory by Parducci (1974) and the
dominance heuristic. The range-frequency explanation basically attributes the effect to the fact
that the introduction of a decoy extends the range of the dimension on which the target is weakest
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and/or it increases the frequency of the dimension on which the target is superior. According
to this explanation, a secondary decoy would boost the effect since it further extends the range
and/or further increases the frequency. On the other hand, the dominance heuristic explanation
attributes the effect to the dominance relationship between the alternatives of a choice set. That
is, agents employ a decision strategy in which they first look for a dominance relation between
alternatives and choose the dominating alternative if such a relation exists. According to this
explanation, a secondary decoy would not change choice behaviors since it does not change the
dominance relationship among the choice alternatives. Hence, our investigation has the potential
to assess these two prominent explanations. In our second hypothesis, we first test the existence
of the asymmetric dominance effect with two decoys and then compare it to the case with a
single decoy.
Hypothesis 2.
(a) The asymmetric dominance effect exists when there are two decoy lotteries (T3 and T4).
(b) The addition of a second decoy has a further impact on the asymmetric dominance effect
(T3 versus T1, T4 versus T2).
Considering a secondary decoy gives rise to a question similar to the one investigated by
Hypothesis 1: Is the impact of the asymmetric dominance effect with two decoys different on
LVLs than on HVLs? We expect a similar result as in Hypothesis 1, and therefore our next
hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 3. The asymmetric dominance effect with two decoys is stronger when the target
is a low-variance lottery than when it is a high-variance lottery (T0 versus T3, T0 versus T4).
Since all decisions are to be made under risk, individual preferences towards risk must be
addressed and choice behavior triggered by the degree of risk aversion disentangled from possible
asymmetric dominance effects. According to Frederick (2005), risk preferences are strongly
tied to a person’s cognitive ability and therefore constitute an important determinant when
making risky decisions. The relation between risk and behavior has also been examined in
many experimental studies, showing that subjects’ risk attitudes often influence their behavior
in games (see e.g. Straub, 1995, Schmidt et al., 2003, or Goeree et al., 2003). We are therefore
interested in how the asymmetric dominance effect is related to risk preferences. Assuming
consistency between risk attitudes and choice behavior, we expect that the share of choosing
the LVL increases with the degree of risk aversion. Therefore, we derive that the strength of
the asymmetric dominance effect will be moderated by risk preferences. Our corresponding
hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 4. The strength of the asymmetric dominance effect varies with individual risk
preferences.
4 Experimental Results
The asymmetric dominance effect can be tested in two ways. The first one is used in between-
subject experimental designs and is run by comparing choice distributions between two sets: a
set consisting of two baseline alternatives and another that includes the same two alternatives
together with a decoy. A significant increase in the proportion of subjects choosing the target
alternative indicates the asymmetric dominance effect. The second way, which is used in within-
subject design experiments, is to compare choice distributions between two sets, each of which
includes the same two baseline alternatives but a decoy targeting a different alternative. The
switch of choice from the target of one set to the target of the other set indicates the asymmetric
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dominance effect. We utilize both techniques in our analysis. The comparison of observations
from treatment T0 with any other treatment gives the between-subject tests. The comparison
of observations from the first half of the tasks with those from the second half in treatments T1,
T2, T3 and T4 gives the within-subject tests.
Table 2 shows the choice distribution for each treatment. As mentioned earlier, in treatments
T1, T2, T3 and T4 the decoys are always targeting an LVL in the first half of the tasks (from
1 to 27) and an HVL in the second half (from 28 to 54). The results from these treatments
are presented in Table 2 as two-by-two contingency tables. For each contingency table, the
upper left and lower right cells represent consistent choices (either lotteries LVL or HVL are
chosen under both decoy conditions). The upper right and lower left cells represent inconsistent
patterns of choice: the upper right cell shows the frequency of choosing LVL when the decoy
favors an LVL and choosing HVL when the decoy favors an HVL. Thus, the upper right cell
corresponds to the asymmetric dominance effect. In Table 2, we exclude the observations in
which a decoy lottery is chosen. There are 23 such observations in treatment T1, 6 in T2, 30 in
T3 and 27 in T4. In total, 86 out of 3024 observation pairs were excluded (2.8%). This strong
tendency to avoid choosing a decoy alternative indicates that subjects can easily identify them.
Table 2 reveals that we successfully replicate the classical asymmetric dominance effect (with
a single decoy) when choice alternatives are two-outcome lotteries. In treatment T1, where we
use r-decoys, 17.7% of choices and in treatment T2, where we use f -decoys, 19.9% of choices
exhibit a highly significant asymmetric dominance effect (X 2-Test(df=1), T1: X 2 = 155.9580,
p < 0.001; T2: X 2 = 164.9768, p < 0.001).
In order to test Hypothesis 1, we need to compare the observations from treatment T0 to
those from T1 and T2, separately. In treatment T0, the choice share of LVLs and HVLs are
56.7% and 43.3%, respectively. First let us consider how the shares are distributed when choice
sets include a decoy that targets an LVL (tasks from 1 to 27 of treatment T1 and T2). As shown
in Table 3, the choice share of LVLs in treatment T1 is significantly higher than in T0 (70.9%
versus 56.7%; X 2-Test(df=1): 32.415, p < 0.001) and the same holds true also for treatment
T2 (71.9% versus 56.7%; X 2-Test(df=1): 37.9328, p < 0.001). On the contrary, when choice
sets include a decoy that targets an HVL (tasks from 28 to 54 of treatment T1 and T2), the
choice share of HVLs are not statistically different (39.4% versus 43.3% for treatment T1; X 2-
Test(df=1): 2.2231, p > 0.1 and 42.1% versus 43.3% for treatment T2; X 2-Test(df=1): 0.279,
p > 0.1). In total, these results show that the asymmetric dominance effect is stronger when
the target is an LVL than when it is an HVL, and provide support for Hypothesis 1.
Now we turn our attention to the cases with two decoys. Table 2 reveals that 21.4% of choices
in treatmentT3 and 21.5% of those in treatmentT4 account for the preference reversal described
by the asymmetric dominance effect. Regardless of decoy types, we observe a significant choice
distortion in the direction of target lotteries when choice sets include two decoy lotteries (X 2-
Test(df=1), T3: X 2 = 136.9546, p < 0.001; T2: X 2 = 113.4453, p < 0.001). Hence, we find
support for Hypothesis 2(a). In order to investigate Hypothesis 2(b), we first examine the impact
of a secondary r-decoy by comparing choice shares of treatment T1 and T3. The difference
between the shares of the two treatments is significant (X 2(df = 3) : 7.8981, p = 0.048), meaning
that the introduction of a secondary r-decoy boosts the asymmetric dominance effect. In order
to gain more insight, we deepen our analysis by examining choice shares of T1 and T3 in the first
and the second half of the tasks, separately. The comparison of choice shares of the tasks in which
an LVL is the target (tasks from 1 to 27) yields no significant difference (X 2(df = 1) : 1.8787,
p > 0.1). Differently put, the addition of a secondary r-decoy has no significant effect when the
decoys target an LVL. On the other hand, the comparison of T1 and T3 in tasks in which an
HVL is the target (tasks from 28 to 54) yields a significant difference (X 2(df = 1) : 7.5652,
p = 0.0060). This shows that including a secondary r-decoy that targets an HVL significantly
increases its choice probability, and hence gives rise to a boost in the asymmetric dominance
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effect. Secondly, we compare treatments T2 and T4 to see the impact of a secondary f -decoy.
We find that the difference between the choice shares of the two treatments is not significant
(X 2(df = 3) : 2.9206, p > 0.1). The same holds true when we examine the first and the
second half of the tasks separately (X 2-Test(df=1), tasks from 1 to 27: X 2 = 0.1070, p > 0.1;
tasks from 28 to 54: X 2 = 0.0591, p > 0.1). Thus, we conclude that the introduction of a
secondary decoy lottery has an increasing impact on the asymmetric dominance effect only if
the two decoys of the choice set are r-decoys and they target an HVL. Hence, we partially accept
Hypothesis 2(b). As mentioned earlier, the two prominent explanations for why the classical
asymmetric dominance effect (with a single decoy) is observed are the range-frequency theory
by Parducci (1974) and the dominance heuristic. While the former predicts a boost, the latter
predicts no change in the asymmetric dominance effect when there are multiple decoys. Even
though their predictions differ, they both agree that the impact should not depend on the type
of the target. Thus, neither of them can totally explain our results.
Now we know that the classical asymmetric dominance effect (with a single decoy) has a
(a) Choice Shares Treatment T0
treatment T0 tasks 1-27
LVL 429 (56.7%)
HVL 327 (43.3%)
total 756 (100%)
(b) Choice Shares Treatment T1
treatment T1
tasks 28-54
LVL HVL total
X 2(df = 1) : 155.9580
tasks 1-27
LVL 390 (53.2%) 130 (17.7%) 520 (70.9%)
p < 0.001 HVL 54 (7.4%) 159 (21.7%) 213 (29.1%)
total 444 (60.6%) 289 (39.4%) 733 (100%)
(c) Choice Shares Treatment T2
treatment T2
tasks 28-54
LVL HVL total
X 2(df = 1) : 164.9768
tasks 1-27
LVL 390 (52%) 149 (19.9%) 539 (71.9%)
p < 0.001 HVL 44 (5.9%) 167 (22.3%) 211 (28.1%)
total 434 (57.9%) 316 (42.1%) 750 (100%)
(d) Choice Shares Treatment T3
treatment T3
tasks 28-54
LVL HVL total
X 2(df = 1) : 136.9546
tasks 1-27
LVL 336 (46.3%) 155 (21.4%) 491 (67.6%)
p < 0.001 HVL 52 (7.2%) 183 (25.2%) 235 (32.4%)
total 388 (53.4%) 338 (46.6%) 726 (100%)
(e) Choice Shares Treatment T4
treatment T4
tasks 28-54
LVL HVL total
X 2(df = 1) : 113.4453
tasks 1-27
LVL 362 (49.7%) 157 (21.5%) 519 (71.2%)
p < 0.001 HVL 56 (7.7%) 154 (21.1%) 210 (28.8%)
total 418 (57.3%) 311 (42.7%) 729 (100%)
Note: Numbers in bold correspond to the asymmetric dominance effect
Table 2: Choice Shares across Treatments T0(a)-T4(e)
11
Su¨ru¨cu¨, Brangewitz, Mir Djawadi:
Asymmetric Dominance Effect with Multiple Decoys
compared treatments LVLs (tasks 1-27) HVLs (tasks 28-54)
T0 versus T1 X 2(df = 1) : 32.4150, p < 0.001 X 2(df = 1) : 2.2231, p > 0.1
T0 versus T2 X 2(df = 1) : 37.9328, p < 0.001 X 2(df = 1) : 0.2790, p > 0.1
T0 versus T3 X 2(df = 1) : 18.2146, p < 0.001 X 2(df = 1) : 1.5067, p > 0.1
T0 versus T4 X 2(df = 1) : 33.7301, p < 0.001 X 2(df = 1) : 0.0801, p > 0.1
Table 3: Statistical Test Results for Comparisons of T0 with other Treatments
stronger impact when the target is an LVL than when it is an HVL (Hypothesis 1), and that
the effect still exists when there are two decoys (Hypothesis 2(a)). A natural question arises
as to whether the type of the target lottery matters also in the case of two decoys. To explore
this question, we compare the observations from treatment T0 to those from T3 and T4,
separately. As shown in Table 3, the choice share of LVLs in treatment T3 is significantly
higher than that in T0 (67.6% versus 56.7%, X 2(df = 1) : 18.2146, p < 0.001) and the same
holds true also for treatment T4 (71.2% versus 56.7%, X 2(df = 1) : 33.7301, p < 0.001).
On the contrary, the choice share of HVLs does not seem to be significantly different (46.6%
versus 43.3% for treatment T3, X 2(df = 1) : 1.5067, p > 0.1, and 42.7% versus 43.3% for
treatment T4, X 2(df = 1) : 1.5067, p > 0.1). Hence, like in the case of a single decoy, the
asymmetric dominance effect is stronger when the target is an LVL than when it is an HVL,
and Hypothesis 3 is supported. Turning now to the last analysis, we explore how the observed
asymmetric dominance effect is related to individual risk preferences. First, we group subjects
into four categories based on their degree of elicited risk aversion. Then, we examine whether
there are significant differences in the asymmetric dominance effect across the different risk
categories.
As described in the experimental design, we elicit the subjects’ degree of risk aversion by
using the binary lottery framework of Dohmen et al. (2010). Subjects are asked to fill out
Table 4 deciding in each row whether they prefer a safe option (Option A) or an all-or-nothing
lottery (Option B). In this table, the payment that Option A yields increases from line to line
by 1 Euro. To provide incentives, two subjects in each session were chosen by chance and were
then paid for one random decision row of their table, in addition to their earnings from the main
experiment.
Option A Option B
1 0 e for sure 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e
2 1 e for sure 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e
3 2 e for sure 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e
...
...
...
20 19 e for sure 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e
Table 4: Lottery Framework to Measure the Degree of Risk Aversion
We define 4 risk attitude categories ranging from risk averse, slightly risk averse, risk neutral
and risk seeking and use the row where subjects switch once from the lottery (Option B) to the
safe choice (Option A) as a sorting key to assign subjects to the risk categories. Specifically,
if subjects switch before row 10 they are classified as being risk averse. If the switching row is
between 11 and 13 (14 and 16), subjects are categorized as slightly risk averse (risk neutral).
Finally, subjects switching after row 16 or never are characterized as being risk seeking. Table 5
shows the corresponding distribution of our sorting procedure. Note that subjects, who switch
more than once between the options, have been excluded from the sample as their risk pref-
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erences appear to be random.2 To make sure that our sorting procedure is correct, we follow
Holt and Laury (2002) and Goeree et al. (2003) and apply a maximum likelihood analysis to
the binary lottery choices to infer the parameter of relative risk aversion. Consistent with the
literature, we find that our estimated parameters fall exactly in intervals that were determined
in the literature for assigning subjects to the risk categories defined above.3 Thus, we have
strong support for our sorting procedure being correctly done.
treatments
risk category T0 T1 T2 T3 T4 total
risk averse 7 7 15 11 12 52
slightly risk averse 8 11 8 8 10 45
risk neutral 7 6 3 4 2 22
risk seeking 3 3 2 4 1 13
total 25 27 28 27 25 132
Table 5: Number of Subjects by Risk Attitude Categories
We first consider the control treatment T0 and examine whether the frequency of less risky
choices (LVL) increases with the degree of risk aversion. Table 6 shows for each treatment the
number of LVL versus HVL choices. Subjects assigned to the risk seeking category choose the
less risky lottery 35.80% (= 29/81) of the times. This ratio for risk neutral, slightly risk averse
and risk averse subjects are 40.74% (= 77/189), 68.06% (= 147/216) and 69.31% (= 131/189),
respectively. To assess the statistical significance of this result, we use the Jonckheere-Terpstra
Test for ordered alternatives, which tests the null hypothesis that choice behavior across all
the risk attitude categories is statistically the same. The first row of Table 6 shows that the
Jonckheere-Terpstra Test for our control treatment T0 yields a p-value below 0.1 which provides
a strong support that subjects who are more risk averse are choosing the less risky alternative
LVL significantly more. Thus, we find first support for consistency between individual risk
preferences and choice behavior in the experiment.
risk slightly risk risk J-T test
averse risk averse neutral seeking (z-value, p)
number of LVL vs number of HVL choices
T0 choices 1-27 131 vs 58 147 vs 69 77 vs 112 29 vs 52 6.93, p < 0.01
T1
choices 1-27 132 vs 54 231 vs 63 102 vs 55 48 vs 30 2.03, p < 0.05
choices 28-54 109 vs 80 208 vs 88 73 vs 80 48 vs 32 1.288, p < 0.1
T2
choices 1-27 339 vs 63 134 vs 81 51 vs 30 17 vs 37 8.71, p < 0.01
choices 28-54 299 vs 105 95 vs 120 31 vs 50 13 vs 41 9.81, p < 0.01
T3
choices 1-27 227 vs 54 150 vs 63 73 vs 34 33 vs 71 7.85, p < 0.01
choices 28-54 197 vs 99 124 vs 92 38 vs 69 28 vs 76 7.67, p < 0.01
T4
choices 1-27 234 vs 83 201 vs 65 34 vs 20 22 vs 5 0.214, p > 0.1
choices 28-54 202 vs 119 157 vs 111 27 vs 27 14 vs 13 1.935, p < 0.05
Table 6: Lottery Choices by Risk Attitude Categories
We further investigate whether the existence of single and multiple decoys affects this rela-
2We had to exclude 8 of 140 subjects (5.7% of the subject sample) from the analysis.
3We obtain risk parameters of r equal to 0.567 (risk averse), 0.389 (slightly risk averse), 0.078 (risk neutral)
and −0.316 (risk seeking). In fact our classification is consistent with the ranges provided in Holt and Laury
(2002) (Table 3) and Goeree et al. (2003) (Table 5) with the exception of those classified as slightly risk averse.
Our estimation of r = 0.389 for slightly risk averse subjects according to their lottery choices is somewhat above
the range 0.09 < r < 0.36 defined in Goeree et al. (2003) but within the range defined in Holt and Laury (2002):
0.15 < r < 0.41.
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tionship. Table 6 presents the Jonckheere-Terpstra Test results for the first and the second half
of the tasks in treatments T1-T4 separately. With only one exception (the first half of the tasks
in treatment T4), we find over all treatments and choice sets similar patterns of consistency:
that is, the share of the LVL increases with the degree of risk aversion. As shown in Table 6, this
relationship holds true even if the decoy is targeting an HVL in the second half of the tasks.4
We deepen our analysis by examining whether the asymmetric dominance effect is moderated
by individual risk preferences. With this purpose in mind, we scrutinize the behavior described
by the effect across the four risk attitude categories in treatments T1 to T4. Table 7 shows
that with only two exceptions (risk seeking subjects in treatments T2 and T4) the asymmetric
dominance effect is significant for every risk attitude category. This indicates that irrespective
of their degree of risk aversion, subjects exhibit the asymmetric dominance effect. Additionally,
we find with only one exception that the strength of the asymmetric dominance effect does
not differ across the risk categories (Jonckheere-Terpstra Test, T1: z = 0.570, p > 0.1; T2:
z = 3.567, p < 0.01; T3: z = 0.828, p > 0.1; T4: z = 1.321, p > 0.1). From these findings we
can conclude that the effect in consideration does not depend on the degree of risk aversion and,
thus, reject our last hypothesis.5
treatment risk category asymmetric dominance effect X 2 test (value, p)
T1
risk averse 36 (19.35%) 40.1450, p < 0.01
slightly risk averse 42 (14.33%) 72.9781, p < 0.01
risk neutral 37 (24.67%) 19.3511, p < 0.01
risk seeking 14 (18.18%) 6.5208, p < 0.01
T2
risk averse 60 (14.96%) 79.1587, p < 0.01
slightly risk averse 52 (24.30%) 41.1170, p < 0.01
risk neutral 26 (32.10%) 6.7333, p < 0.01
risk seeking 11 (20.37%) 1.7088, p > 0.1
T3
risk averse 57 (20.36%) 33.7512, p < 0.01
slightly risk averse 41 (19.25%) 49.0848, p < 0.01
risk neutral 37 (34.91%) 18.4889, p < 0.01
risk seeking 16 (16.00%) 11.7032, p < 0.01
T4
risk averse 60 (19.05%) 47.1843, p < 0.01
slightly risk averse 64 (24.24%) 34.1654, p < 0.01
risk neutral 7 (12.96%) 31.7647, p < 0.01
risk seeking 10 (37.04%) 0.3453, p > 0.1
Note: As in Table 2 the asymmetric dominance effect is given as the number of observations in which
an LVL is chosen in a task from the first half of tasks (1-27) and an HVL is chosen in the
corresponding task from the second half (28-54). The percentage is shown in brackets.
Table 7: Observed Asymmetric Dominance Effect by Risk Attitude Category
4One may argue that the findings might be affected by the relatively low numbers of risk seeking subjects. As
a further robustness check, the tests have been repeated after merging the risk neutral and risk seeking categories.
The results, available in Table 9 of Appendix B, remain unaltered.
5As before, the analysis is repeated after merging the risk neutral and risk seeking categories. The results
show that the asymmetric dominance effect is significant for every risk attitude category with no exception and
it is still uncorrelated with the degree of risk aversion. This additional analysis can be retrieved in Table 10 of
Appendix B.
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5 Discussion
This experimental study adds to the understanding of the asymmetric dominance effect when
choice sets consist of two-outcome lotteries. Our analysis suggests that the impact of a decoy
on a low-variance lottery (LVL) is much higher than on a high-variance lottery (HVL) of the
same expected value. As far as we are aware of, there are only three experimental studies that
consider the asymmetric dominance effect when choice alternatives are two-outcome lotteries:
Huber et al. (1982), Wedell (1991) and Herne (1999). None of these studies investigates whether
the type of a target alternative (in terms of its relative riskiness) has an impact on the effect.
However, the results presented by Herne (1999) seem to be parallel to our finding: the choice
share of a target is higher when it is an LVL than when it is an HVL. The way the results are
presented by Huber et al. (1982) and by Wedell (1991) does not allow to make a similar analysis.
The literature concerning the asymmetric dominance effect considers choice from a set that
consists of a target, a competitor and a decoy alternative. Our second contribution to this
literature is to show that the choice probability of a target lottery systematically increases also
when the choice set includes two decoys. We further show that the inclusion of a secondary
decoy lottery boosts the asymmetric dominance effect only if the two decoys of the choice set
are r-decoys that target an HVL. For all the other cases in which the two decoys are of the same
type, the asymmetric dominance effect with two decoys is not significantly different than the one
in the presence of a single decoy. Hence, the impact of a secondary decoy depends on the types
of the target and the decoy lottery. This finding falsifies the predictions of the two prominent
explanations from the psychology literature for why the classical asymmetric dominance effect
(with a single decoy) is observed. While the range-frequency theory by Parducci (1974) predicts
an increase in the effect no matter the type of the target alternative, the dominance heuristic
explanation forecasts no impact at all. Furthermore, even though a secondary decoy boosts the
effect for when an HVL is the target, it does not suppress the validity of our first result. To be
precise; the asymmetric dominance effect with two decoys is stronger when the target is an LVL
than when it is an HVL (of the same expected value). However, the fact that this experimen-
tal study only used two-outcome lotteries warrants discussion about the generalization of our
findings. Further research, particularly in the domains of marketing and consumer behavior, is
needed to examine whether these effects prevail outside the domain of abstract and monetary
lotteries.
Another contribution of our paper is to investigate the correlation between risk aversion and
the asymmetric dominance effect. We find that the effect under investigation does not induce
any inconsistency in risk behavior and the trend that the more risk averse subjects are, the more
the less risky alternative is chosen, is preserved. One might expect a lower choice distortion in
the direction of the target lottery from risk averse subjects, since they are expected to stick more
to an LVL even if an HVL is targeted. We find, on the contrary, that the asymmetric dominance
effect emerges irrespective of risk attitude and there seems to be no correlation between the size
of the effect and the degree of risk aversion. Hence, the presence of decoys subtly make decision-
makers choose against their risk preferences, at least to some extent. One interesting avenue for
further research would be to provide further sensitivity analysis around this phenomenon. For
example, one can increase the salience about the risky nature of the lotteries. Combined with
higher stakes one can provide an even more critical test environment for investigating whether
the asymmetric dominance effect still prevails in those extreme settings.
Our research has both practical and theoretical implications. On the practical side, it could
potentially be of great help in developing profitable marketing strategies for insurance companies,
policy makers or product designers. For example, we see similarities between our lottery design
and the risks and returns of investment products and portfolios. Our results suggest that if a
designer wants to promote an LVL against an HVL product it would be enough to use a single
decoy (of any type) that is dominated by the LVL. On the other hand, if an HVL needs to
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be promoted against an LVL, including two decoys that extend the probability range into the
choice set (two r-decoys) works better than considering a single decoy. Especially in this domain
it is plausible that the degree of risk aversion is an important determinant for choosing among
the different portfolios and products. Drawing on our findings, there is a substantial chance that
even risk averse investors might consider products which entail higher risk components if they
are targeted by a decoy product. On the theoretical side, our results could be integrated into
a behavioral industrial organization model to examine the interaction between principals and
agents exhibiting the asymmetric dominance effect.6 Such a model could have the potential to
answer questions like: “How can a monopolist exploit consumers exhibiting this effect?”, “Does
market competition mitigate this exploitation?” or “How do firms’ exploitative strategies affect
welfare?”
6See e.g. Eliaz and Spiegler (2006), Orhun (2009), Barbos (2010), Eliaz and Spiegler (2011), Su¨ru¨cu¨ (2016).
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A Lotteries
The lotteries we used for the experiment are listed in Table 8. In the control treatment, subjects face
27 choice sets consisting of two lotteries, which we refer to as baseline lotteries. The expected payoffs
for these lotteries within the same choice set are always identical (except possibly for small deviations
because of rounding). This implies that one of them is a low-variance lottery (LVL) with a high prob-
ability of low winnings and the other is a high-variance lottery (HVL) with a low probability of high
winnings. The 27 choice tasks of the control treatment T0 are given in the second and the third
columns of Table 8. In the other treatments, we use the same set of 27 baseline lotteries together
with their relevant decoys. Note that since we juxtapose each baseline pairs once to a decoy (two de-
coys) targeting an LVL and once to a decoy (two decoys) targeting an HVL, subjects face 54 different
choice tasks. In treatment T1, we use a single r-decoy, hence the tasks of this treatment are of the
form {LVL,HVL,LVL′r} or {LVL,HVL,HVL
′
r}. In treatment T2, we use a single f -decoy, hence the
tasks of this treatment are of the form {LVL,HVL,LVL′f} or {LVL,HVL,HVL
′
f}. In the remaining
two treatments T3 and T4, we use two r-decoys and two f -decoys, respectively. Hence, the choice
tasks of this treatment T3 (T4) are of the form {LVL,HVL,LVL′r,LVL
′′
r} or {LVL,HVL,HVL
′
r,HVL
′′
r}(
{LVL,HVL,LVL′f ,LVL
′′
f} or {LVL,HVL,HVL
′
f ,HVL
′′
f}
)
.
no. LVL HVL LVL′r LVL
′′
r HVL
′
r HVL
′′
r LVL
′
f LVL
′′
f HVL
′
f HVL
′′
f
1, 28 40% 175 20% 350 40% 165 40% 155 15% 350 10% 350 35% 175 30% 175 20% 340 20% 330
2, 29 45% 156 25% 280 45% 146 45% 136 20% 280 15% 280 40% 156 35% 156 25% 270 25% 260
3, 30 50% 140 30% 233 50% 130 50% 120 25% 233 20% 233 45% 140 40% 140 30% 223 30% 213
4, 31 55% 127 35% 200 55% 117 55% 107 30% 200 25% 200 50% 127 45% 127 35% 190 35% 180
5, 32 60% 117 40% 175 60% 107 60% 97 35% 175 30% 175 55% 117 50% 117 40% 165 40% 155
6, 33 65% 108 45% 156 65% 98 65% 88 40% 156 35% 156 60% 108 55% 108 45% 146 45% 136
7, 34 70% 100 50% 140 70% 90 70% 80 45% 140 40% 140 65% 100 60% 100 50% 130 50% 120
8, 35 75% 93 55% 127 75% 83 75% 73 50% 127 45% 127 70% 93 65% 93 55% 117 55% 107
9, 36 80% 88 60% 117 80% 78 80% 68 55% 117 50% 117 75% 88 70% 88 60% 107 60% 97
10, 37 40% 188 20% 375 40% 178 40% 168 15% 375 10% 375 35% 188 30% 188 20% 365 20% 355
11, 38 45% 167 25% 300 45% 157 45% 147 20% 300 15% 300 40% 167 35% 167 25% 290 25% 280
12, 39 50% 150 30% 250 50% 140 50% 130 25% 250 20% 250 45% 150 40% 150 30% 240 30% 230
13, 40 55% 136 35% 214 55% 126 55% 116 30% 214 25% 214 50% 136 45% 136 35% 204 35% 194
14, 41 60% 125 40% 188 60% 115 60% 105 35% 188 30% 188 55% 125 50% 125 40% 178 40% 168
15, 42 65% 115 45% 167 65% 105 65% 95 40% 167 35% 167 60% 115 55% 115 45% 157 45% 147
16, 43 70% 107 50% 150 70% 97 70% 87 45% 150 40% 150 65% 107 60% 107 50% 140 50% 130
17, 44 75% 100 55% 136 75% 90 75% 80 50% 136 45% 136 70% 100 65% 100 55% 126 55% 116
18, 45 80% 94 60% 125 80% 84 80% 74 55% 125 50% 125 75% 94 70% 94 60% 115 60% 105
19, 46 40% 200 20% 400 40% 190 40% 180 15% 400 10% 400 35% 200 30% 200 20% 390 20% 380
20, 47 45% 178 25% 320 45% 168 45% 158 20% 320 15% 320 40% 178 35% 178 25% 310 25% 300
21, 48 50% 160 30% 267 50% 150 50% 140 25% 267 20% 267 45% 160 40% 160 30% 257 30% 247
22, 49 55% 145 35% 229 55% 135 55% 125 30% 229 25% 229 50% 145 45% 145 35% 219 35% 209
23, 50 60% 133 40% 200 60% 123 60% 113 35% 200 30% 200 55% 133 50% 133 40% 190 40% 180
24, 51 65% 123 45% 178 65% 113 65% 103 40% 178 35% 178 60% 123 55% 123 45% 168 45% 158
25, 52 70% 114 50% 160 70% 104 70% 94 45% 160 40% 160 65% 114 60% 114 50% 150 50% 140
26, 53 75% 107 55% 145 75% 97 75% 87 50% 145 45% 145 70% 107 65% 107 55% 135 55% 125
27, 54 80% 100 60% 133 80% 90 80% 80 55% 133 50% 133 75% 100 70% 100 60% 123 60% 113
Table 8: Lotteries
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B Additional Tables
Tables 9 and 10 are obtained by merging the two categories of risk neutral and risk seeking.
risk slightly risk J-T test
averse risk averse neutral/seeking (value, p)
number of LVL vs number of HVL choices
T0 choices 1-27 131 vs 58 147 vs 69 106 vs 164 6.93, p < 0.01
T1
choices 1-27 132 vs 54 231 vs 63 150 vs 85 1.96, p < 0.05
choices 28-54 109 vs 80 208 vs 88 121 vs 112 1.60, p < 0.1
T2
choices 1-27 339 vs 63 134 vs 81 68 vs 67 8.45, p < 0.01
choices 28-54 299 vs 105 95 vs 120 44 vs 91 9.72, p < 0.01
T3
choices 1-27 227 vs 54 150 vs 63 106 vs 105 7.08, p < 0.01
choices 28-54 197 vs 99 124 vs 92 66 vs 115 7.57, p < 0.01
T4
choices 1-27 234 vs 83 201 vs 65 56 vs 25 0.283, p > 0.1
choices 28-54 202 vs 119 157 vs 111 41 vs 40 1.943, p < 0.05
Table 9: Lottery Choices by Risk Attitude Categories
treatment risk category asymmetric dominance effect X 2 test (value, p)
T1
risk averse 36 (19.35%) 40.1450, p < 0.01
slightly risk averse 42 (14.33%) 72.9781, p < 0.01
risk neutral/seeking 51 (22.47%) 25.0530, p < 0.01
T2
risk averse 60 (14.96%) 79.1587, p < 0.01
slightly risk averse 52 (24.30%) 41.1170, p < 0.01
risk neutral/seeking 37 (27.41%) 10.5326, p < 0.01
T3
risk averse 57 (20.36%) 33.7512, p < 0.01
slightly risk averse 41 (19.25%) 49.0848, p < 0.01
risk neutral/seeking 53 (25.73%) 31.6728, p < 0.01
T4
risk averse 60 (19.05%) 47.1843, p < 0.01
slightly risk averse 64 (24.24%) 34.1654, p < 0.01
risk neutral/seeking 17 (20.99%) 26.2745, p < 0.01
Note: As in Table 2 the asymmetric dominance effect is given as the number of observations in which
an LVL is chosen in a task from the first half of tasks (1-27) and an HVL is chosen in the
corresponding task from the second half (28-54). The percentage is shown in brackets.
Table 10: Observed Asymmetric Dominance Effect by Risk Attitude Category
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C Instructions
The instructions for all treatments and the questionnaire were originally in German. The English in-
structions presented here are a translation of the originally used ones.
C.1 Experiment Instructions (English version)
Note that these are the instructions for treatment T3 and T4. The number of lotteries, the notation and
the figure have been adapted accordingly for the remaining treatments.
General Instructions
• During the experiment all payments are stated in the fictitious currency “Taler”.
• The experiment today consists of 54 decisions situations.
• In none of your decisions does your payment depend on the decisions of the other participants.
• After the experiment we would like to ask you to fill out a questionnaire. For this you will receive a
short instruction as soon as the experiment will have ended. For your responses there is no “right”
or “wrong”. The answers of the questionnaire have no influence on your payment.
Course of the Experiment
• In all of the 54 decision situations you are asked to decide between different lotteries.
• In every decision situation there are 4 alternative lotteries available. These are denoted by A, B,
C und D.
• Exemplarily the following lotteries are displayed in one decision situation:
Lottery A
175 Taler
40%
0 Taler
60%
With this lottery you
have a 40% chance
to win 175 Taler,
nothing otherwise.
Lottery B
350 Taler
20%
0 Taler
80%
With this lottery you
have a 20% chance
to win 350 Taler,
nothing otherwise.
Lottery C
165 Taler
40%
0 Taler
60%
With this lottery you
have a 40% chance
to win 165 Taler,
nothing otherwise.
Lottery D
155 Taler
40%
0 Taler
60%
With this lottery you
have a 40% chance
to win 155 Taler,
nothing otherwise.
To better understand the probabilities of the different lotteries, imagine for lottery A above an urn
that contains 100 balls. 40 balls are blue and 60 balls are white. One ball is drawn from this urn.
If the ball is blue, you would win 175 Taler and if the ball is white, you would win 0 Taler.
• After you have selected a lottery and confirmed your choice on the screen, the next decision situation
starts with the new set of lotteries.
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Payments:
• Only one decision situation is relevant for your payment.
• After every participant has completed the 54 decision situations, one participant in the room is
asked to randomly draw the payment-relevant decision situation. Each of the 54 decision situations
is displayed on a card and put in an urn. The chosen participant is asked to draw exactly one of
these cards. The card and the related decision situation is for the payment of all participants.
• For your payment, the lottery that you have chosen in this decision situation is played by yourself.
To do this you are asked to draw a ball from an urn that contains exactly 100 balls.
• The balls in this urn are either blue or white. The urns are prepared such that the number of blue
balls and white balls corresponds to the probabilities of the lottery you selected. If you draw a
blue ball, you receive the positive amount in Taler related to that lottery. If you draw a white ball,
you receive 0 Taler.
• The payment of your lottery will be converted with an exchange rate of 1 Euro per 20 Taler and
will be paid in cash together with a show-up fee of 4 Euro.
Please Note:
• During the entire experiment, any and all forms of communication are not permitted.
• All mobile phones must be switched off during the complete duration of the experiment.
• The decisions you make within this experiment are anonymous: i.e., none of the other participants
gets to know the identity of a person who has made a specific decision.
• Please remain seated until the end of the experiment.
• You will be called forward for your payment by your seat number.
Good luck and thank you very much for your participation in this experiment!
C.2 Questionnaire Instructions (English version)
Note that the screenshot included in the questionnaire has been translated in English and is shown
schematically.
Questionnaire Instructions
• The experiment is over now.
Questionnaire Instructions - Part I
• In part I of the questionnaire we would like to know how you would choose between a safe payment
(Alternative A) and a lottery (Alternative B).
• The following screen will be presented to you:
In each row please select if you prefer the safe payment (Alternative A) OR the lottery (Alternative B):
1) Alternative A: 0 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
2) Alternative A: 1 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
3) Alternative A: 2 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
4) Alternative A: 3 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
5) Alternative A: 4 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
6) Alternative A: 5 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
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7) Alternative A: 6 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
8) Alternative A: 7 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
9) Alternative A: 8 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
10) Alternative A: 9 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
11) Alternative A: 10 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
12) Alternative A: 11 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
13) Alternative A: 12 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
14) Alternative A: 13 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
15) Alternative A: 14 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
16) Alternative A: 15 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
17) Alternative A: 16 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
18) Alternative A: 17 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
19) Alternative A: 18 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
20) Alternative A: 19 e for sure ◦ ◦ Alternative B: 50% chance of winning 30 e and 50% chance of winning 0 e.
• In each line (from 1 to 20) you have two options:
– A safe payment (Alternative A).
– An “all-or-nothing”lottery in which you can win 30 Euro with a probability of 50% and
nothing with a probability of 50% (Alternative B).
• For each line please choose either alternative A or B. Mark the left field if you choose Alterna-
tive A or the right field if you choose Alternative B.
Additional profit opportunity in part I of the questionnaire:
• In the first part of the questionnaire you have another chance to win a payment.
• Two participants in this room will be randomly drawn.
• For the drawing of the two winners, two cards will be randomly drawn from the numbered cards
ranging from 1 to 28.
• The chosen participants will receive their additional payout when all payments are distributed after
answering the second part of the questionnaire.
• If you are among the two chosen participants, the additional payment is determined by means of
a twenty-sided dice.
• The first draw of this dice determines the line that is payment-relevant.
• If you decided to take Alternative B for the line which will be paid out, you will be asked to cast a
twenty-sided dice again. With the numbers 1 to 10 you receive 30 Euro, with 11 to 20 you receive
nothing. If you decided to take Alternative A, you will receive the safe payout immediately.
When all participants complete the first part of the questionnaire, part II will follow. The answers in
part II are irrelevant for the payout. All questions will be evaluated anonymously and communication is
not allowed during the complete experiment.
Thank you very much for your participation in this experiment!
